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This  paper  presents  a  test  of  Weisbrod's  hypothesis  that  a public-
goods aspect  to  education,  coupled  with  anticipaued  enigration  by
students,  leads  corununities  to  underlnvest  ln  educauion.  IC
analyzes,  in  a  sirnultaneous  equatiorrs  franework,  the  effects  of
both  irnrnigration  and  emigration  on htgh  school  finance  decisions
in  the  United  states.  The analysis  does no!  support  the
hypothesis  of  a public  investnent  motive  in  educational  fi.nance.
However,  the  revealed  negative  correlation  between  irnmigration  and
educational  expenditures  suggests  that  conmunities  may be  free-
rlding  on human capltal  produced  elsewhere  by  subscitutlng
" imported"  hurnan  capital  for  local  production.Human  capltal  may or  nay noE generate  external  l.tl.es .  Many economi-sts
strongly  disagree  on  the  subject.  There  are  several  arguments,  however,  that
support  the  notion  that  human capital  (or  rnore specifically,  the  average  level
of  human capital  in  a jurlsdictlon)  produces  externality  effects.  For
exanples  of  these  argruuents,  see Weisbrod  (1"964), Hlrsch  and Marcus  (l-969),
Holtman (l-971) or  Lucas (1988).
If  human capital  produces  exterrElities,  then  a  conrnunity's  expenditures
on  educatLon  should  be  correlated  wtth  its  efficiency  in  producing  externallty
benefits.  Tn his  1964 research  report  External  Benefits  of  public  Education:
An Economic Analysis,  Burton  Weisbrod  theorizes  that  nigration  patterns
lndicate  the  efficiency  of  educationaL  expenditures  in  producing  externslity
benefits  because  the  nalority  of  externality  benefits  accrue  to  the  conmunity
only  if  the  educated  lndividuals  do not  move alray.  Ernpirical  analyses  of  this
hypothesls  by lCeisbrod (L954) and Charles  Clotfelter  (1976) supporr  rhe
hypothesis  by  finding  a negative  correlation  between  emitration  and
educational  expenditures.
This  paper  extends  the  uork  of  Weisbrod  (1964)  and Clorfelter  (1976)  by
exanining  the  rerationship  between migration  and educational  expenditure  when
both  euigration  and  lrnrnlgration  are  endogenous rather  than  exogenous.  Unlike
previous  work,  this  analysis  also  incorporates  an educacional  production
function  to  reflect  efficieney  differences  in  producing  hunan capltal.  Data
for  the  analysis  come from  che  Longitudinal  data  set  High  School  and.  Beyond
and the  1980 census.  The analysis  is  conducted  across  states  a!  the
individual  school  level  -
I  find  that  emigration  and expenditures  are  positively  correlated  in
states  that  finance  schools  with  a  foundation  formula.  Therefore.  r  cannorsupPort  the  hlpothesis  of  a  public  lnwestment  motive  in  educatlonal  flnance.
However,  I  flnd  a  negative  correlation  between  innigration  and  educational
expenditures,  suggesting  that  conmunities  may be  substttutlng  ',  imported"  human
capltal  for  local  production.
The  Relatlonshlp  Betveen  !fl.glatlon  and  Educatlon
Assume,  for  the  monent,  that  human  capital  produces  externalities,  and
let  the  average  level  of  educational  attalruent  within  the  comeunlty  tndicate
the  extent  of  those  externalities.  In  thls  situation,  the  ability  of
conmunities  to  capture  educational  externalltles  becomes  a  function  of  their
abllity  to  lncrease  the  locaL  average  education  1evel.  Ceteris  paribus,
eonnunitles  that  antlcipate  hlgh  ernigraclon  of  lndividuals  educated  locally
should  be  less  willing  to  pay  for  investnents  ln  educatlon  because  the
educational  expenditures  will  not  succeed  in  increasing  the  general  ed,ucation
lewel.  The  negative  effect  on  expendltures  should  be  nost  pronounced  when
conmunities  anticlpate  the  nigration  of  recent  graduates,  because  then  the
present  value  of  any  lost  benefits  is  at  its  largest.  On the  other  hand,  !f
educatlonal  expendltures  attract  new  residents  that  afe  already  highly
educated,  then,  ceterls  paribus,  conmunitles  that  experience  high  funrnlgration
of  educated  persons  should  be  rnore willing  to  pay  fo!  schooling.  Finally,  lf
school  expendLtures  ate  not  an  attraction  for  educated  persons,  then
conmunlties  that  anticipate  hiBh  irnnigration  of  educated  indiwiduals  should.
substitute  this  "ieported"  hunan  capltal  for  the  rocally  produced  variety  and
be  less  wllling  to  pay  for  schooling,  ceteris  paribus.
These  expected  relatiouships  between  educational  expenditures  and
rnlgratlon  under  the  assunptioD  of  human  capital  externalitles  suggest  a  testof  the  h)pothesls  that  education  is  an  iurpure  publlc  investment  good.l  In
sinplest  terns,  one  tests  for  the  exlstence  of  a  stgnificant,  negative
correlation  bet\reen  the  enigration  of  recent  students  (gi.wen  the  level  of
inmigration  by  indlwiduars  with  cornparabre  human  capital)  and  the  wirringness
of  communl-ties  to  pay  for  their  education  (as  revealed  by  the  level  of
community  spending  on  education),  ceteris  paribus.  If  such  a  eorrelation
exists,  then  one  can  conclude  that,  fron  a  cornrnunity  perspectlve,  educatlon
expenditures  are  at  least  in  part  investments  in  future  hr:man capital
externarities.  After  all,  the  private  benefi-ts  from  education  are  not  lost
when  the  graduate  noves.
The  dlrecti.on  of  causation  also  seems  clear  in  the  case  of  nigratlon  by
recent  graduates.  Fanllies  with  school-age  children  nay  be  attracted  to
cornmunlties  that  spend  heavlly  on  sehools  and  repelled  by  conmunities  thab
spend  llttle  on  them,  but  the  populatlon  of  recent  high  school  graduates  ls
very  unlikery  to  have  such  children.  rt  is  inprobable  that  their  migration  is
motivated  by  the  lure  of  alternative  public  school  systems..  For  this  group,
there  1s  no  purely  private  explanation  for  lbe  rate  of  out  migratlon  by  recent
graduates  to  increase  as  expendicures  on  education  decline,  ceteris  paribus.
The  mlgration  literature  holds  that  if  anything,  the  better  educaced  are  nore
likely  to  uowe.2  I  can  therefora  Lnterpret  a  negatlwe  correlation  between
educatlonal  expenditures  and  emigration  of  recent  students  as  support  for  the
hypothesis  that  public  investment  motives  influence  sehool  finance.  A
positive  correlation,  on  the  other  hand,  neither  conflrms  nor  re.iects  the
'  Because there  are  substantial  prlvate  benefits,  education  cannot  be  a
pure  public  good.
2 See, for  example, Borsch-Supan (1990),  Schultz  (Lgg2:}  or  Myers (Lg12).5
hypothes is .
While  nigration  nay  affect  educational  expendttures,  uany  comnunity
characteristlcs  affect  migraElon.  Educatlonal  quantlty  (years  of  schooling)
ls  signlficantly  and positively  correlated  with  the  propenslty  to  uigrate.  By
extension,  there  should  be  a  similar  correlation  for  educatlonal-  quality.  To
the  extent  that  school  qualtty  is  attributable  to  school  expenditures,  local
expenditures  on  education  will  lnfluence  the  future  ruigration  patcerns  of
students.  Further,  a  search  for  school  quality  probably  leads  parents  to
nigrate  in  dlrect  response  to  the  lewel  of  school  expenditures;  parents  are
attracted  to  conrnunlties  with  high  expenditures  and repelled  by  conmunities
with  row expenditures.  At  the  very  least,  characteristics  of  the  local  labor
narket  that  ttelp  to  define  the  conurunity,s  abiltty  to  pay  for  schools  also
define  the  llkelihood  of  rnigration  for  reasons  of  eroployrnent.
The  Research  Fralssork
A proper  test  of  the  relatlonship  between migratlon  and educational
expenditures,  therefore,  requlres  a  fornulation  that  incorporates  the
endogeneity  of  nigratlon.  Consider  a  systen  of  four  simultaneous  equations:
one  for  expenditures,  anouher  two  for  mlgration  (both  in  and  out)  ,  and a
fourth  for  educarional  qualiry.  Specifically:
EXPEND
l,lovEouT
-  f (Y,  S,  T,  MOVEOUT,  MoVEIN,  e,  )






MOVEIN  -  h(L,F*,C,POSTTEST,EXPEND,E,)
POSTTEST  -  I (  F, PRETEST,  EXPEND,  €  A  )
where  EXPEND  is  the  current  school  expenditure  per  pupil  (locally)
3r  assume that  communities  decide  on  the  level  of  suppor!  for  schools  but
are  seldorn involved  in  the  professronal  decisions  concerning  the  manner in
r'rhich those  funds  are  spent,  and  that  therefore  the  distrlbution  of  funds  needo
ls  the  irnnigration  of  ind.ividuals  with  a  high  school  diplorna  (as  a  fraction  of
conuunity  population);  MoVEOUT  !s  the  emigration  rate  among recent  studenrs;
POSTTEST  is  a  measure  of  post-secondary  school  hr:man capltal;  y  is  a  vector  of
those  factors  that  deterxnine  the  community's  income  (such  as  personal  incornes
and  unemployment  rates  or  intergoverruental  transfers);  S  is  a  vector  of  the
exPliclt  costs  of  educatLon  (such  as  teacher  salaries);  T  is  a vector  of
educational  taste  parameters  (such  as  the  general  education  level  or  €,verage
farnily  slze);  L  is  a  vector  of  local  labor  narket  characteristics  (such  as  the
nanufacturing  wage  and  unemploynent  rate);  F  is  a  vector  of  student  and  family
charac  teristics  ;  F*  is  a  vector  of  inmitrant  characteristics;  C  ls  a  vectot  of
cornnunity  characteristics  ;  PRETEST is  a  ueasure  of  hurnan capital  prior  to  the
relevant  level  of  schooling;  and  the  €rs  are  error  terms.  The  lncone  and
Iabor-force  vectors  (Y  and  L,  respectively)  have  some nembers  in  conmon,  whLle
the  local  taste  for  education  (T)  lncludes  some of  the  farnily  and  conmunity
parameters  found  in  F  and  C,  respectively,  This  formulation,  unlike  those
used  in  previous  analyses,  allons  nigration  rates  to  be  influenced  by
expenditures  via  the  effecc  of  expendicures  on  educationar  quality  and  arrows
educational  expendltures  to  be  lnfluenced  by  both  irurigration  and  emigration.
Each  equatlon  in  this  ideal  system  represents  one  of  the  four  endogenous
variables.  The  quality  equation  excludes  innlgrant  characcerlstics  (F*),
communLty characteristics  (Y,  L  and  C),  educatlonal  tastes  (T),  and  local
educations  costs,  such  as  starting  teacher  salaries  or  indicators  of
unionization  included  in  vector  S.  The  innigration  equation  excludes  the
pretest  of  human capital  and  local  education  costs,  and  the  expenditures
not  be  considered  here.  This  is  particularly  likely  when on conslders  onry
current  expenditures.equatlon  excludes  nlgrant  characteristics  and  the  pretest.  The order
conditions  for  identifying  each of  these  equations  are  thus  satisfied.
Because expenditures  are  the  focus  of  this  approach,  the  technique  is
sufflcient  for  rny purposes  --  the  estinatlon  of  the  effect  of  ernigration  on
expenditures.  A  signlflcantly  negative  effect  lndtcates  a public  lnvestment
goods aspect  to  education.
I.Ihen  using  thls  nodel  to  test  the  lmpure  public  investment  goods
hypothesis  for  secondary  schools,  particular  care  nust  be  taken  in  the
specification  of  the  emlgration  varisble  (MOVEOUT)  to  isolate  recent  public
school  student  migratlon  fron  general  mlgration.  The nigration  pattern  of
parents  notivated  by  the  search  for  quality  schooling  (and  therefore  leaving,
corDmunitles wlth  loI,I quallty/expenditures  )  rnirnics the  negative  correlation
between  expenditures  and enitration  expected  under  the  impure  public
investment  goods hypothesis.  Thus,  general  data  that  lnclude  the  nigration  of
parents  sith  school-age  children  are  biased  in  fawor  of  the  hypothesis  and
should  not  be used  to  test  it.  Arbitrarily  deleting  parents  frou  the  data
set,  however,  would  introduce  self-serect.ion  bias.  By linitlng  consideration
to  data  from  recent  graduates,  parental  nigration  motlves  are  effectively
purged  from  the  data  without  bias.  I{hen the  respondents  are  too  young  to  have
school-age  chlldren  (and  definitely  too  young  to  have high  school  age
children)  there  ean be  no  question  of  se  lf-selection.  a  This  approach  has  the
added advantage  of  focusing  attention  on  indlviduals  in  whon the  present  value
of  any  educatl.onal  externality  is  naximized,  hlghlfghting  the  iBpact  of  their
1It  is  conceivable  that  a recent
school  age  or  have  a  child  born  during
such  situations,  however,  are  probably
uhe analysls  is  negligible.
graduate  may have  step-children  of
the  student's  own high  school  years.
sufficiently  rare  tha!  their  effect  onpotential  emigration.  Only  public  school  student  migration  should  be  used
because  this  ls  the  group  in  which  investment  may have  been  made,  and  only
their  behavior  is  relevant.
Sinilar  care  should  be  taken  when  measurlng  funrnlgratlon  to  consider  only
those  irnmlgrants  already  endor,red with  a  level  of  human  capital  comparable  to
that  of  the  (potentially)  emigrating  srudents,  After  all,  only  comparably
educated  iruligrants  afe  substitutes  for  the  local  students  in  the  production
of  an  increased  local  average  education  level.
Applying  the  Research  Framework
Thls  analysis  of  the  impure  public  lnvestment  goods  hypothesis  relies
heawily  on  data  from  the  High  School  and  Beyond  (HSB)  data  set,  which  was
gathered  between  1980  and  1985  by  the  National  Center  for  Educational  Research
at  the  instigation  of  the  U.S.  Department  of  Educatlon.  The  data  set  follows
the  secondary  education  and  post-secondary  activities  of  up  to  thirty-six
students  in  the  soptlonore  class  and  a  like  number  in  the  senior  class  from
each  of  1,015  high  schools  in  the  United  States.  The  students  were  surveyed
four  times  at  two  year  intervals  starcing  in  their  sophomore  and  senl-or  years,
respectively.  The  survey  responses  provide  s  tudent-specific  daEa  on  migraElon
patterns,  emplo).ment  and  general  dernographics.  In  addition,  identical
acadeDlc  achievement  tests  were  administered  co  the  younter  cohort  at  the  Cime
of  the  sophornore  and  senior  surveys,  vhile  the  elder  cohort  answered  an
identified  subset  of  the  test  questions  at  the  time  of  the  senior  survey.
This  paired  data  permits  construction  of  a  strong  vaLue-added  tesE  of  school
quality.  Reports  fron  the  schooLs,  adrninistrations  provide  specific
inforrnation  about  the  hlgh  schools  attended  by  these  students.
The  HSB data  set  permits  analysis  of  student  emigration  and  publicschool  expendltures  at  the  local  lewel.  Senior  ni8ration  patterns  can be
comPuted for  each HSB school  using  survey  data  frou  just  less  than  six  years
after  the  students'  expected  graduations.  Among the  school  infornation  are
data  on hlgh  school  expenditures  per  pupll.  Further,  HSB  provides  census  data
on county  per  capita  personal  incones,  unernployrnent rates,  and awerage hourly
nanufacturing  wages.5  The a&linistratlon  survey  provides  data  on  teacher
salaries  and  student  body  cornposition  by  school.
A  secondary  advantage  to  HSB is  that  data  on union  representatlon  of
teachers  are  available  from  the  same adninistration  survey.  These data  pemit
testing  for  distinctions  bet\deen union  and nonunion  school  districts  in
educatlonal  production  and  finance.
In  most  parts  of  the  country,  the  school  district  is  the  jurlsdiction
responsible  for  school  expenditures  decislons  and the  jurisdiction  most
couparable  to  the  admittedly  loose  deflnitiou  of  comrnunity used  above.  To use
HSB for  this  test,  !t  is  necessary  to  assume that  the  school  dlstrict  is  a
representatlve  component of  the  county  (or  for  those  regions  in  which  there
are  many school  distrlcts  per  county,  Ehat  the  county  is  represenEative  of  ttre
whole dlstrict),  and thar  the  school  chosen by  the  conpilers  of  HSB  ls  a
representative  high  school  in  the  district.  such  assunptions  are  consiscenc
wlth  the  described  study  design.
Data  problems  remain,  however,  One problern  arises  frorn prlvacy
conslderations  that  nske  rnerging HSB and census  data  difficult;  a  second
problen  arlses  lrithin  HSB  itself.
HSB has  not  been  designed  '.rith  this  test  in  mind,  and  consequently  1t
5In  sorne cases,  Scandard  Metropolitan  Statistical  Area  data  on lrages
substitute  for  county  data.l-0
provides  no  inforrnation  on  local  irnmigration.  Migration  data  are  avallable
from  the  1980  census,  but  the  problem  with  collating  the  data  is  twofold.
First,  the  census  provides  a  breakdor,m  of  iumigfation  by  educatlonal
attalnxnent  only  at  the  state  level,  forcing  me  to  assuee  thaE  county
irurigratlon  is  roughly  proportional  to  total  state  innigratlon  ln  percentage
Eetms.s  Second,  HSB for  reasons  of  studenc  privacy  does  not  identify  the
states  in  which  its  hlgh  schools  are  located  (rnuch  less  the  counties).
Fortunately,  it  is  possible  to  infer  state  locations  for  HSB from  the
students'  college  attendance  patterns  and  to  use  the  lnferred  state
identlfications  to  graft  stale-Iewel  data  onto  HSB.  The  lnference  procedure
(discussed  in  more  detail  in  Hanushek  and  Taylor  1990)  concludes  thaL  a  HSB
high  school  is  located  in  a  particular  state  if  a  large  percentage  of  the
post-secondary  studencs  fron  tha!  high  school  received  their  post-secondary
schooling  in  tbat  stare.  This  procedure  idenrified  797  of  the  869  public
schools  that  at  leasc  partiaLly  cornpleted  the  school  administrator,s
questionnalre.  Many  of  the  unidentified  high  schools  are  undoubtedly  located
on  the  border  between  states,  such  as  in  Kansas  City  or  l{ashington  D.C.,  or  in
geographically  sna1l  states.  T
The  other  significant  misnatch  between  the  ideal  nodel  and  HSB is  the
current  btevity  of  the  longitudinal  data  set.  Between  then,  the  younger  and
6Total  state  irnrnigratlon  is  the  sum of  gross  state  inuDigration  and
intrastate  migration.  Intrastate  migration  is  a  measure  of  the  percentage  of
state  residents  lrho  report  a  county  of  residence  in  1980  that  is  different
fron  their  county  of  residence  in  1975  but  chat  is  in  the  same  state.  This
cornbLnation  represents  a  gfoss  neasure  of  movenent  into  counties  within  the
'Sorne  schools  may have  been lost  because  of  unusually  high  rnigration  for
educational  purposes  which  led  a high  percentage  of  the  students  to  attend
post-secondary  schools  in  differenc  states.1"1
eld.er  cohotts  provide  sufflci.ent  lnfornation  to  test  the  conplete  systero of
equations,  but  independently  each cohort  is  nissing  one essential  year  of
observations.  The younger  cohort  has  the  advantage  of  the  paired  test  data,
but  the  most  recent  follow-up  survey  (1-986) was administered  less  than  four
years  after  traduatlon  (during  the  traditional  college  years).  Any migratlon
data  that  thls  cohort  prowides  ls  probably  tainted  by  sEudents  who have  left
home to  attend  college  and are  expected  Lo return.  On the  other  hand,  the
1986 survey  of  the  elder  cohort  prowides  migration  data  frorn just  under  six
years  afler  high  school.  These data,  which  were  gathered  after  the
tradltional  undergraduate  years,  are  nuch  Less  likely  to  lead  !o  confusion
between  temporary  nigration  for  educational  purposes  (a  potentlarry  desirable
event  from  the  hone eonmunity's  perspective)  and permanent  migration  that
depriwes  the  home conmunity  of  any expected  externalities.  UnfortunateLy,  the
elder  cohort  lacks  any pretest  data,  seriously  flawing  any  estinatton  of
educational  quallty  (see  Hanushek and Taylor  1-990).
The following  estimaELon  procedure  is  employed to  deal  r.rlth  this
problen.  First,  the  quality  equation  is  estinated  in  reduced  form  using
individual  data  from  the  surveys  conpleted  in  their  senior  year  by  the  younger
cohort,  the  school's  administration  survey,  and the  1980 census (either
provided  by  HSB or  nerged  dlrectly  at  che state  lewel).  Seven school-Ieve1
wariables  are  constructed  school  averages  using  a  pooLed data  set  containlng
both  elder  and younger  cohort  observations.s  Alchough  drarrm from  the  stud.ent
EThese pooled  varlables  are  HOMEOHN,  the  percentage  of  parencs  at  the
school  who own their  hone;  S-EDMALE  and S-EDFEMALE,  the  average  effecriwe
years  of  education  for  the  nale  and  female  parent  or  guardian,  respectively
(if  there  Ls  no  such  person  in  the  household,  then  the  educacion  is  not
reported,  and  treated  here  as  zero);  S-!/CI,IALE  and S-WCFEI,IALE,  the  fraction  of
rnale and  female  parents  or  guardians  who hold  (or  have  nost  recently  held)
white  collar  jobs,  respectiwely;  S-NUMROOMS,  the  average  nurnber of  rooms inL2
survey  resPonses,  these  constructs  are  lntended  to  measure conmunlty  rather
than  student  characteristics  and represent  a  part  of  the  comnunity
characteflstic  and  taste  vectors.  The dependent  warLable  (POSTTEST)  ls  the
total  nudber  of  correct  answers  on the  mathenatics,  reading,  and vocabulary
tests  taken  by  the  younger  cohort  during  their  senior  year.  It  is  used  as  a
measure of  post-secondary  human capital.  The measure of  incorning  human
capital  (denoted  PRETEST)  is  the  total  nurnber of  correct  anslrers  on the  counan
nathenatics,  reading,  and vocabulary  tests  taken  by  the  younger  cohort  during
their  sophomore year.  All  of  Che questions  on  the  common  tests  were  asked  of
both  the  elder  and younger  cohort  during  L980 and represent  a  subset  of  the
questlons  asked  of  the  younger  cohort  during  1982  (their  senior  year).
Incorning  human capltal  also  enters  the  estimation  quadratically  (variable
PRESQUARE  )  to  capture  the  nonlinearlties  in  achievenent  growth  found  in
previous  studies  of  the  educalion  production  function.
Formally,  the  reduced  forn  POSTTEST  equation  estimates
POSTTEST:a+o,  PRETESTy+a2  pRESQUAREy  +px+p ,
where X-(Y,  S,  T,  L,  F,  F*,  C)  is  a vector  of  all  the  exogenous  variables  in
the  systex0 of  equations,  excepc  PRETEST,  and PRESQUARE".
Because the  nissing  migration  variable  is  endogenous to  the  model,  this
reduced-forn  equation  is  exactly  the  one that  two-stage  Ieast  squares  would
have  estlmated  had  the  younger  cohort  data  been complece.  I  can  therefore
have  considerable  confidence  in  the  estinated  coefficients  (the  ps)  and use
then  with  the  elder  cohort  data  to  derive  a  fitted  value  for  the  elder
the  student's  places  of  residence;  and  S-NUMSIBS,  the  average  nunber  of
student  siblines.13
cohort's  post-secondary huran capital,  denoted POSTHAT.e  PRETEST€,  the
estimate  of  incouring  human capital  for  the  elder  cohort,  is  missing  and
ignored  !n  creating  thls  instru&ental  variable.  Specifically,
POSTHAT-a  +  pX. .
T'tIe fitted  walue  PosrHAT ls  correlated  wiLh  rhe  varlables  in  x  (and  thus  wich
PosrrEsr)  but  uncorrelated  wlth  the  error  cerms.  As  such,  it  is  a  consistent
estimator  for  the  indivldual  stock  of  human capital,  albelt  a  decidedly
imperfect  one.  sPosrHAT, the  school  mean value  of  posrHAT.  ls  then  used  as  an
i.nstrumentar  varlable  for  posrrEsr  in  migratlon  equations  of  the  ideal  systeu,
and the  system  is  reduced  to  three  estinable  equations.
EXPEND  .  f(  Y,  S,  T,  MOVEOUT,  MOVEIN,  :1 )
MOVEOUT  '
MOVEIN '
-  C( L,  F,  C,  sPosTHAT,  12)




This  sinplified  system of  equations  can now be  estinated  using
instrunental  vatiables.  Data  on  school,  cotrutrunlty, imrnlgracion,  and labor-
market  characteris  tl-cs  are  unchanged fron  those  used  to  fit  posrltAT.  schoql-
level  measures  of  student  and farnily  characteristics  (  iueluding  emigratlon)
are  construcEed  exclusively  from  the  elder  cohort  surveys.l0  Students  who
reported  that  their  residence  in  February  1.985  was more than  flfty  rniles  frorn
the  conEunity  in  which  they  attended  their  seniot  year  of  hlgh  school  (in
1980)  are  said  to  have  uoved  signiflcantly.  The uigration  variable  used  ln
'Such  a  derivatlon  is  possi.ble  because
cohort  can  be  paired  with  the  data  frorq  the
high  school  artended  by  both  cohorts.  The
can  be  thought  of  as  two  random  draws  frorn
students  at  a  given  school.
the  data  from  the  younger  HSB
elder  HSB cohort  accordlng  to  the
two  classes  (sophomore  and  senlor)
the  sarne pool  of  publlc  high  school
10The  emigration  data  are  the  only  inforrnation  used  at  this  stage  that
were not  collected  for  1980 (the  elder  cohort,s  senior  year).  Data used
earlier  fron  the  younger cohorc's  senior  year were collected  in  19g2.L4
tbis  systen  is  the  fraction  of  respondents  from  each  school  who have
significantly  mowed.  11
I'he  expenditures  variable  !s  the  local  contrlbution  to  the  high  school,s
per  pupil  expenditure  (LOCALEXP).  Thls  variable  is  construcred  by  weighing
the  high  sehool  per  pupil  expenditure  (as  reported  on  the  school
adminlstrator's  questionnaire)  by  the  average  local  share  in  educauional
expenditure  for  the  state  in  1980  (National  Center  for  Education  Statistics
l-983).  Sinilarly,  a measure of  the  level  of  state  (STBASE)  and federal
(FEDBASE)  support  for  schools  is  consrructed  by  weighing  rhe  high  school  per
pupil  expenditure  by  the  shares  in  average  scbool  expenditures  of  state  and
federal  spending,  respectively.  The daca  are  available  for  380 schools.12
Local  flscal  incentives  vary  wlth  the  state,s  school  finance  structure.
The flnancing  structures  fall  into  two broad  categories  --foundation  formulas
and guarantee  formulas.  Under  a  foundation  formula.  the  state  sets  a mininu[
uThe  1986 survey  nas  adninistered  to  less  than  half  of  the  students  in
the  elder  cohort.  Most of  the  students  lost  were deliberately  deleted  by HSB
before  the  1982 survey.  From that  point  on,  only  a  sample  (  lnteuded  to  be
proportionally  representative  on certain  key  dimensions  of  interest  to  HSB --
most  noEiceably,  ethnicity)  was surveyed.  Although  extensive  efforts  were
made to  locate  all  nembers of  the  representative  sample,  only  88 percent  of
the  sample  senior  cohort  responded  to  che  L986 survey.  The school  average
migraEion  rates  are  constructed  frorn  this  group.  It  is  likely  that  chese
averages  underestimate  the  true  rnigration  rate  because  the  students  HSB could
not  locate  are  probable  migrants.
12 Three  hundred  fifty  schools  uhat  provided  all  other  necessary
lnforrnation  did  not  fespond  to  the  question  on  the  level  of  hlgh  schoo]-
expenditures.  To deterrnine the  bias,  if  any,  introduced  by  nonresponse, I
constructed  an  indicator  variable  for  response  and tested  for  the  partial
correlation  between  the  indicator  and school  characteristics  using  ordinary
least  squares,  Of  the  wariables  used elser.rhere  in  this  analysis,  only
MILETECH, the  dlstance  to  a vocational  or  technical  school,  was significant  at
the  5-percent  level.  High  schools  that  provided  expenditures  data  were
farther  from  vocational  pos!-secondary  institutions  than  high  schools  that  dld
not  provide  data,l)
level  of  educational  expenditure.  Generally,  Iocal  school  expenditures
supplenent  state  and  federal  aid,  but  in  some  states  (within  a  ceftaln  range
of  expendltures)  state  ald  can  dimlnlsh  as  local  expenditures  lncrease.  Under
a  guarantee  progr:rm,  state  ald  lncreases  as  local  expenditures  increase,
although  not  at  the  same rate.
Under  a  foundation  system,  the  !0arginal  cost  to  the  corutrunity  of  an
additlonal  dollar  ln  educational  spendlng  is  essentially  one  do11ar  of
additlonal  taxatLou.  Hor{rever,  under  a  guarantee  systen  the  uarginal  cost  to
the  conuruni Ly  of  an  additional  dorlar  in  educatlonal  spending  is  a  function  of
the  rate  at  which  the  state  matches  local  revenues.  Because  I  lack
inforrnation  on  the  approprlate  matching  rates  to  apply  in  states  with
guarantee  financing  systems,  I  resttict  my  attentlon  to  states  with  foundation
systems  as  the  primary  feature  of  their  school  finance  structure.13
Complete  data  are  available  for  153  schools  in  foundauion  states.  To
control  for  wariations  in  the  size  of  the  student  populations  from  whlch
school-lewel  variables  are  constructed,  analyses  at  the  school  lewel  are
weighted  by  the  nurnber  of  students  !n  the  elder  cohort.la  Tables  1,  2,  and  3
Present  detalls  of  the  speciflcation  together  qrith  estlmated  coefflcients  and
standard  errors.  Table  4  presents  variable  means  and  standard  deviations.
The  appendlx  presents  a  conplete  description  of  the  variables  used  in  this
analvs  is -
Enpirically,  the  appropriateness  of  pool,ing  union  and nonunion  sehool
13The inforrnation  on  fiscal  structure  used  here  comes  frorn  Tron  (19g2)
taThe  elder  cohort  for  each  school  has  norninally  thircy-six  members,
(except  for  schools  ulth  fewer  than  thlrty-six  senlors,  in  which  case  all
seniors  are  sampled),  but  the  distribution  of  missing  responses  to  survey
questions  is  not  uniform  and  therefore  the  effective  cohort  size  varies.!o
districts  for  tbis  analysis  rernains  questionable.  Eberts  and  Stone  (1987)
find  slgnificant  differences  in  educational  production  functlons  between  union
and  nonunion  elementary  schools,  and  the  potential  influence  of  teacher's
unions  on  education  finance  ls  obvLous.  A  Chow test  of  the  reduced-form
educatlonal  production  functlon  (equation  4)  does  not  reject  pooling  of  data
on  union  and  nonunion  schools  at  the  5-percent  LeveL,  nor  is  pooling  rejected
for  the  educational  finance  equation  (equation  1).  The  seerning  contradiction
of  Eberts  and  Stone's  research  rnost  llkely  reflects  the  enphasis  in  their  work
on  teacher  and  principal  characteristics  that  are  not  a  part  of  this  analysis,
Because  the  ptlrnary  interest  of  thls  paper  is  educational  finauee,  uniou
l-nfluence  on  the  dlstributlon  of  educational  resources  is  not  addressed.  The
indication  of  insigniflcant  union  influence  on  the  size  of  the  educational
budget  (per  pupil)  is  somewhat  unexpected,  but  it  is  not  inconsistent  with  a
theory  of  efficienc  labor  contracts.
Testlng  the  Inpure  Pub!.Lc  Investnent  Coods  Hypothesls
My  interest  ln  the  effect  of  emigration  on  school  expendltures  leads  me
to  highlight  the  effect  of  the  migration  variables  on  LOCALEXP.  According  to
the  impure  publlc  investnent  goods  hypothesis,  emigration  by  recenL  students
should  negatively  affect  the  local  willingness  to  pay  for  schools.  In  the
framework  discussed  above,  the  variable  MOVEOUT  isolates  the  effect  of
emigration  on  expenditures,  and  fron  Table  2  it  is  clear  that,  contrary  to  the
findlngs  of  Weisbrod  (1964)  and  Clocfelter  (L976),  this  effecr  is
signlficantly  positive  in  this  estination.  I  cannot  accepc  the  null
hypothesis  of  a  publlc  investnent  motive  in  educational  finance.
Those  with  strong  ptiors  in  favor  of  the  publicness  of  education  rnay
resist  such  a  conclusion.  There  are  interesting  community  charac  ter  ist  lcs  ,such  as  the  slze  of  the  local  tax  base,  that  are  unavailable  froxn HSB and
therefore  could  not  be  used  in  thls  analysis.  Ttris  Lntroduces  the  possibility
of  omitted  wariables  bias  ln  at  least  the  expendltures  equation.  Although
obwious  outllers,  such  as  schools  with  annual  per  pupll  expenditures  of  $d,
have  been  rernoved fron  the  working  data  set,  neasurenent  error  is  always  a
problem.ls  No eupirical  work ls  free  frou  these critlcisns.  Nonetheless,  no
nore  accurate  test  of  the  hypothesis  can be  conducted  at  this  tiue.
Accepting  the  verdict  of  the  data,  there  are  three  possible
interpretations  .  Either  education  is  not  an  ixnpure publlc  investment  good,  or
other  objectives  dominate  community behavior,  or  educatlon  is  a  public
Lnvestuent  good but  the  rate  of  return  is  such  thac  the  coumunities  in  the
sanple  do not  choose  to  consune  it.
Clearly,  ona possible  conclusion  is  that  communities  do not  perceive  a
public  lnwescxoent goods aspect  to  education.  The data  scate  qulte  flruly  that
these  expenditures  decislons  are  not  negatively  influenced,  by  the  subsequenc
nigration  of  students.  Thls  correlatlon  may be  due to  the  absence of
significant  external  benefits  or  a  failure  to  perceive  benefits  that  exist
because  of  iroperfect  informatlon  problems.
It  nay  also  be  that  community educational  decisions  are  not  welfare,
profi.t,  or  population  maximizlng.  There are  other  political  objectives  fot
the  school  board,  such  as  re-election,  that  rnay hawe higher  priority.  The
tirne  horizons  of  board  nembers rnay  be  too  short  for  an  investment  model,
Under najorlty  rule,  the  nedian  voter  holds  sway,  and  it  may be  that  the
distribualon  of  education  nithin  the  conmunity  (or  within  the  voters  in  the
l5Any school  reporting
$500 or  teachers,  salaries
Several  other  schools  were
per  pupil  high  school  expenditures  of  less  than
of  less  than  $2500 rras rernoved fron  the  data  set.
not  included  because of  missing  expenditures  data.18
corununity)  ls  such  that  Che median  voter  has  an  abowe-avefage  education.  Such
a  voter  may  find  that  the  scarclty  rents  fron  his  educatlon  outweigh  any
externality  fron  an  Lncreased  average  lewel  of  education.  If  this  is  the
case,  we  \tould  not  expect  to  observe  any  correlatlon  between  rnigration  and  Ehe
conmunity's  willingness  to  pay.
A  third  possible  explanation  ls  that  edusatlon  ls  an  fuopure  public
investment  good,  but  conmunities  are  unvilllng  to  pay  for  any  public  aspects
to  it  because  there  are  cheaper  substiLutes.  The  developnent  of  "homegrolrn"
hurnan capltal  is  only  one  teehnique  for  increasing  Ehe  local  general  education
level.  Another  technique  is  to  import  hr.nan  capital  by  luring  to  the
communlty  lndividuals  already  endowed  rrith  education  above  the  local  norn.  It
nay  be  that  fishing  for  human  eapital  is  rnore  cost  efficient  than  producing
it.  In  this  situation,  we  r,rould  not  expect  to  find  public  goods  concerns
motivating  investment  in  education,
If  communitles  are  free  riding  on  the  externalities  of  hurnan capital
produced  elsewhere  (or  paying  for  it  with  goods  and  services  designed  to  lure
the  educated),  then  one  would  expect  irnmigration  to  significantly  influence
local  school  expenditures,  and  vice  versa.  If  there  is  free  riding,  or  if  the
most  cost  effectlwe  lures  for  the  educated  are  not  educational  expenditures,
then  one  would  expect  to  find  a  negative  correlation  bebween  expenditures  and
inmigration,  ceteris  paribus.  A negatiwe  correlation  is,  after  all,  the
exPected  substitution  response.  If  there  is  a  great  deal  of  hurnan capital
noving  into  the  area,  there  is  no  need  to  pay  to  produce  it  localLy.  This
analysis  indicates  that  educated  irnrnigration  has  a  negative  effect  on  high
school  expenditures  that  is  significant  at  the  S-percent  1evel.  This  supports
the  premise  chat  education  is  not  observed  to  be  an  impure  public  investnentL9
good because  a better  substitute  for  local1y
lmported  hunan  capital-is  available,  As  the
increases,  the  expenditures  on a  substitute
externalities  fall.
produced  human cap  lta}-narnely,
quantity  of  imrnigration
source  of  human capital
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  failure  co  accept  the  lrnpure  publlc
irrwestment  goods  hypothesis  is  not  a  rejecti.on  of  a- public  good  aspect  to
education.  Rather,  this  test  suBgests  that  a  comrnunicy, s  interest  ln
educati.on  (from  a  public  goods  perspectlve)  is  not  the  children  but  their
Parents,  The  willingness  of  nonfaraily  mernbers  to  pay  for  schools  that  has
been  found  in  previous  work  nay  nost  accurately  be  attributed  to  externallties
expected  fron  the  parents  rather  than  to  externalities  expected  fron  the
students.  As  the  population  ages  and  more  indiwiduals  delay  childbearing,
hawe  fewer  children,  and  rernain  childless,  we  should  expect  a  shift  away  frour
educational  expenditures  designed  to  attract  the  parents  of  school-age
children  and  a  shift  totrard  alternative  taxation/exDenditures  schemes  that
attract  those  wichout  children.
other  fopllcatlons  of  rhe  Anal"ysis
There  is  a  great  deal  of  interest  uncovered  in  this  analysis  beyond  che
relationships  between  migration  pattehs  and  educational  expenditures.  In
terms  of  expenditures,  lt  is  very  interesting  that  there  is  no  evidence  for  a
systematic  effect  of  teacher  unionization  or  salaries  on  high  school
expenditures.  It  is  also  interesting  that  the  size  of  the  student  body  (S-
MEMBERS  )  has  only  an  insignificant  effect  on  expenditures.  This  contradicts
the  comuon  notion  that  the  educatlonal  production  function  demonstrates
economies  of  scale.  One  explanatlon  for  this  resu)-t  may be  that  larter
schools  offer  nore  expensive  services  or  laboratory  classes  that  are  beyond20
the  neans of  schools  slthout  a  'ctltlcal  mass' of  students,
Taste  parameters,  I'lth  the  exception  of  the  distance  ueasures  (MILEJUCO
and MILE4YRU), are  generally  inslgniflcant  ln  explalning  educatlonal
expenditure.  rE  Although  I  expected  that  large  dlstances  to  post-secondary
lnstitutions  would  indicate  a  distaste  for  education.  the  data  indicate  that
secondary-school  expenditures  increase  as  discances.  to  post-secondary  schools
increase.  The inslgnificant  effect  of  hone-o!.rnership  rates  found  here
suggests  that  the  disadvantage  of  high  property  taxes  may be  counterbalanced
by  the  potential  capitaLization  of  school  quality  into  property  values,  The
fraction  of  households  in  which  English  is  not  the  donlnant  language  has  a
positive  explanatory  power.  This  is  consistent  \d!th  the  stereotypically
treater  interest  of  non-native  parents  in  their  children's  educatlon.  As
expected,  transfer  payments  from  the  state  (STBASE)  negattvely  (if
insignificantly  )  affect  loca1  spendlng,  There  ls  no  slgnlficanb  distinction
between  the  expenditures  of  urban  and rural  conmunities,  although  suburban
conmunities  rnay spend less  than  urban  conmunities  (the  variable  SUBURBAN  is
signiflcant  at  the  lO-percent  lewel)
In  terms  of  the  nigralion  equations,  school  quality  (PoSTTEST)  is
insignifleant  in  explaining  either  irunigration  or  emigration.  Sex and  race
also  hawe no  overall  effect  on  enigration.  As  is  often  the  case,  the  pattern
of  nlgration  is  away from  rural  areas  and  tonard  urban  ones.  Unemployment
l6Taste  paraneters  are  represented  by  measures  of  average  occupation  and
educatlon  for  males  and  females  in  the  corununity  (  S-WCMALE, S-WCFEMALE, S-
EDMALE  and  S-EDFEMALE, respectively),  the  proportion  of  households  thar  are
non-English  speaking  at  hone  (S-NONENGL),  the  proportion  of  r,rhite  households
(S-WHITE),  and  the  distances  to  post-secondary  schools  (MILE4\RU,  MILETECH and
MILEJUCO).  These  last  three  indicate  a  revealed  preference  for  post-secondary
educational  institutions,  which  nray be  expected  to  indicate  a  taste  for
education  in  general.2L
rates  have  the  expected  effects  on  enigration  but  no  effect  on  irnrnigration,
Manufacturing  wages  hawe  no  signlficant  explanatory  power  in  either  case.
Perhaps  nost  signifl-cant  from  the  perspective  of  flnance  policy,  inurigrants
with  at  least  four  years  of  hlgh  school  are  attracted  by  educational
expenditures  .1?
A  BrI.ef  Digresslon  on  the  Educattonat  productlon  Functlon
The  educatlonal  production  function  also  reweals  sone  very  interesting
relatlonships.  As  ls  frequently  the  case,  fernales  and  rninority  students
denonstrate  smaller  achievement  gains  than  do  white  males.  Students  who
report  a  handicap  also  have  srnaller  gains,  The  amount  of  tine  per  week  spenc
on  a  job  has  a  slgnlficant,  negatlve  effect  on  white  student  achievenent  gains
but  no  effect  on  mlnorlty  students.  Minority  students  may be  less  like1y  to
substitute  work  bours  for  study  tine  either  because  of  greater  discipline  or
because  of  a  lower  propenslty  to  study.
Student  senior-year  performance  (POSTTEST), as  expected,  is  highly
correlated  wlth  sophonore  year  perfornance  (PRETEST).  Because  the  senlor  test
has  more  questions  than  the  sophomore  test,  holrever,  the  reader  should  not
conclude  that  students  lraproved  by  8.9  percent.ls  Senior  performance  !s  also
significantly  and  positlvely  correlated  nith  the  quadratic  value  of  the
sophomote  test  score  (PRESQUARE).  Students  who  are  already  abowe  average  gain
even  more  than  students  who  are  below  averase.  There  is  no  ewidence  for
17The F-statistlc  for  the  joint  hypothesis  that  toEal  educational
erpendlture-local  expendltures  (LoCALEXP)  plus  staLe  expendirures  (STBASE)
plus  federal  expenditures  (FEDBASE)-is  significanr  at  L4.57.
TsPRETEST  incorporates  eighteen  questions  on  mathematics,  elght  on
vocabulary  and  eight  on  reading  conprehension.  The  POSTTEST incorporates
thlrty-eight  questions  on  nathernatics,  tr{renty-one  on  vocabulary  and  nineteen
on  readlng  cornprehens ion.22
systenatic  catching  up  in  these  skills  (mathematics,  vocabulary,  and reading)
during  hlgh  school.
Farolly  charaeteristlcs  are  significant  factors  ln  student  achlevement
gains  as wel1.  Parental  education  and occupation  have  the  expected  effects,
but  the  effect  of  fanily  income  is  lnslgnificantly  negatlve.  However,  the
size  of  the  famlly  hone  (NUMROOMS  )-a  frequenE  proxy  for  socioeconomlc
status-+ras  a  significaut,  posltive  irnpact.
State  and  federal  expenditures  have  no  significant  effect  on achievement
gainsi  STBASE  and FEDBASE  are  jointly  as well  as  individually  insignifieant  at
the  5-perceDt  lewel.  Thls  does not  require  that  total  expenditures  be
insigniflcant,  however.  It  is  likety,  given  the  number of  variables  in  the
reduced  form  that  are  signlflcant  and that  are  not  part  of  the  orlglnal
specification,  that  local  expenditure  is  quite  significant.
Students  aE schools  in  which  the  teachers  are  unionized  show smaller
Sains  (significant  at  the  1o-percent  level)  than  students  at  schools  in  which
the  teachers  are  not  organized.  Whll-e the  size  of  the  senior  class  (S-
MEMBERS)  has  no  explanatory  power here,  this  should  not  be  interpreted  as  an
indlcator  that  class  size,  in  terns  of  pupils  per  classroom or  instructor,  is
insignlficant.  Last,  there  is  no  distinction  here  among  urban,  suburban,  and
rural  schools,
Concluslons
The initial.  conclusion  of  this  analysis  is  the  absence of  support  for
the  inpure  publlc  investrnent  goods hypothesis.  Contrary  to  the  work  of  Burton
I,Ieisbrod  and  others,  this  analysis  finds  thar  rhe  migrarion  of  individuals
educated  locally  does not  lead  to  reductions  in  the  local  willingness  Eo pay
for  schools.  The data  give  no reason to  beLieve  that  enigration23
considerations  lead  to  under- lnvestnent  in  education.
While  emlgration  does not  depress  the  willingness  to  pay  for  schools,
irnrnigratlon  by  indiwiduals  already  endowed  with  the  relevanc  education  d.oes
negatively  influence  expenditures.  Thls  negative  correlation  suggests  that
the  publlc  investment  goods aspects  of  education  are  not  observed  because  of
an alternative  technology  for  generating  educatlonal  external  ities-the
importing  of  hurnan  capital.  If  this  substitution  is  occuring  then  there  uray
be under- inwes  tment  ln  education  as  communities  free-ride  on  the  externalities
of  human capital  produced  elsewhere.  While  the  analysis  supports  the  idea
thst  high  educational  expenditures  attract  educated  indlviduals,  it  nay be
useful  to  investigate  other  components to  the  cornnunlty  expend.itures  mix  that
could  inclease  the  local  education  level  more efficiently  than  noney  spent  on
the  schools.24
PoSTTEST-
R-square  :  .744Q  Adj.  R-Square  :
Table  l:  Fitting  SPOSTHAT
Effective  Yrs.  Schl  Fenale H.H.
Effective  Yrs.  Schl MaIe H.H.
FEMALE  X  MALEHOME
FEMALE X  HRSWORK
FEMALE  X  FINCOME
Federal  Arnt.  of  Schl  ExDend.
Student  is  Fenale
Family  Incorne
Student  Has Handicap
Hours  Worked by  Student
MINORITY X MALEHOME
MINORITY X  HRSWORK
MINORTTY  X FINCOME
Male  Parent  or  Guardian  in  Houe
Student  is  Non-Ithite
No Union  Represents  Teachers
Nunber  of  Rooms in  Home
Nunber of  S  iblings
PRETEST  Squared
Nunber  right  MaLh+Vocab+Reading
High  School  !s  Rurally  Locared
12th-Crade Membership
State  Amt.  of  Schl  Expenditure
Hlgh  School  is  Suburban
Male H.H.  White collar  Job
Fenale  H.  H  .  Iarhite Collar  Job
Avg.  Age of  Fernale Immigrant
CnLy. Per Cap. Pers,  Income 1980
Percent  of  Inunigr ,  White
Awg.  Ed.--Male  Parent  /  Guardlan
g  Student  Body that  is  White
Schl has Separate Tax District


































































(0  .  641)
(o  .027  )
(0.022)
(0.934)








(0  .  001.  )
(0.4s3)
(0.  310  )
(o.7.97)






X  AGE-IN_F  -1. I39
x  cPcPIS0  0.0003
*  PERCENTW  6.229
*  S-EDMALE  0.482
*  s-wHITE  -0.021
*  TAXDIST  0.890
*  Significantly  different  frorn zero  at  the  s-percent  level.
#  Significantly  differents  from  zero  at  the  ].o_percent  1evel.
For  reasons  of  space,  only  those  variables  frorn  the  reduced_form
equation  that  either  are  included  in  Lhe original  speclfication  of  the
quality  equation  or  are  significant  at  the  5:percent  level  have  been
presented  here.  Standard errors  are  in  parentheses.L)
Table  2:  Testins  the  lrnoure  Public  Investment  coods  H-ypothesi.s
].OCAI^EXP-
Intercept  L67.347  (  817  .499  )
cPcP180  0.021  (0.022)
CLNEMRS0  -4.748  (I.2O7)
FEDBASE  1.320  (0.651)
HoMEOr,rN  -346.15t (306.945)
MILE4YRU  ?.972  (1.317)
MTLEJUCo  -0.365  (0.779)
MILETECH  0.311  (  r.004  )
NouNroN  -81.898  (82.245)
RIJRAL  -138.833  (106.578)
S-EDFEMALE  31.341- (69.739)
S-EDMALE  35.269  (36.  s39)
S-MEMBERS  -0.007  (0.207)
S-NoNENGL  4.s66  (1.690)
s-wcFEMALE  L42.49O  (399.857)
S-LICMALE  -45L.443 (372.755)
s-r{HrTE  t .558  (1.564)
sAraRYol  0.012  (0.036)
STBASE  -0.014  (o.L22)
suBllRBAN  -I34.2O5  (81.148)
TAXDTST  6L.294 (54.690)
Cnty.  Per  Capita  Personal  Income
Cnty.  Unenplo)nnenc  Rate  1980
Federal  Ant.  of  SchI  Expenditure
Share  of  Connunity  Homeorrners
Miles  fron  Unlversity  /  College
Miles  fron  a Junior  College
Miles  fron  a Vo-Tech  College
No Unlon  Represents  Teachers
Hlgh  School  is  Rurally  Located
Avg.  Ed.  -Female  Parent/Cuardian
Avg.  Ed.  -MaIe  Parent/Guardian
12th-crade  Meurbership
t  Non-English  Speaking  at  Home
*  Area  Females l,Ihlte  Collat  Jobs
*  Area  Males  White  Collar  Jobs
t  Student  Body that  ls  iihite
Startiug  Salary  BA Teacher
State  Amt.  of  Schl  Expenditure
High  School  is  Located  in  Suburb
Separate Schl Taxation  District
t  Euigratlon  by  Students
?  Educated  IusigratLon
Nurnber  of  Observations  -  153
zero  at  the  S-percent  leveL.






964.736 (428  .434)
-5342.25 (2L69.8I4)
*  Significantly  different  fron
#  Significantly  different  from
S  tandard  errors  irr26
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0.343  *  (0.089)
0.006  (0.006)
0.006  (0.006  )
6.8E-7  (1.3E-6)
-0.0001  (0.000r)
-0.0002  *  (  4.  8E_5  )
4.98_s  *  (1.sE_s)
0.0001  (0.0001)
7.88-5  #  (4.7E-5)
0.0001  (0.0001)
L.lE-6  (1.7E-s)
_L.L47  *  (0.238)
_0.210  *  (0.038)
0.004  (0.003  )
MOVEOUT=
-o.725 #  (0.409)
1.7E_s  *  (6.9E_G)
R-squale:  .5935
*  Significanrly  differenr
#  Signiflcanrly  different
from  zero  at  the  s-percent  level.
from  zero  at  the  l-O-percent  Level.
Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  A  dot  indicates  variables  that  ale  noc








































































































(o  .  s2)
(0.64)
(16.r0)
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Definins  the  Variables
varlablea
High  School  principal's  report  of  per  pupll  expendirures  at  his
high  school  r{eithted  by  the  average  proportion  of  educational
revenues  raised  locally  fof  that  state.
Percent  of  seniors  at  the  high  schooL who report  that  their
residence  in  L986 (six  years  after  their  senior  year)  is  more than
50 niles  fron  the  conmunlty  in  which  they  went  to  high  school.  S.
Ixnnigrants  with  at  least  four  years  of  high  school  as  a percentage
of  total  state  population.  This  variable  ls  constructed  by
determlning  the  lewel  of  total  irlmigration  within  a  state  (as
represented  by  the  numbet of  new residents  plus  the  nunber  of
residents  reportinB  a different  county of  residence  fn  L980);
dividing  by  the  total  stare  population;  and weighing  rhe  resulr  by
the  fraction  of  state  imroigrants  who hawe at  least  four  years  of
high  school,  C.
The sun of  the  nunrber of  correct  answers  orr the  mathematics,
vocabulary  and reading  tests  administered  during  the  students'















Average  age of  (at  least  high  school  educated)  male  immigrant.
AGE-IN-FEMALE:  Average  age of  (at  least  high  school  education)  fernale
iffnigrant,  C.
Councy per  capita  personal  income  in  1-980.  HSB.
County  unexnploynent rate  for  1980.  HSB.
Effective  years  of  schooling  by  fenale  head of  household.  Equals
zero  when there  is  no  such person  living  with  the  student.  S.
Effective  years  of  schooling  by  male head of  household.  Equals
zero  Lrhen there  is  no  such person  liwlng  wlth  the  studen!.  S.
FEMALE x  MALEHOME  .
FEMALE  x  MILE4YRU.
FEI,IALE  x  MILEJUCO  .
FEI4ALE  x  MILETECH.
FEI'IALE  x  HRSWORK.
FEMLE  x  FINCOME.
The estirnated  federal  share  of  education  spending.  This  warlable
was conslructed  by  multiplying  the  average  federal-  share  in  school
expenditures  for  each state  (1980) by  the  principal,s  report  of
per  pupil  high  school  expenditure.
The studenc  is  fernale.  HSB
Family  income.  S.
:  Student  does noc  report  the  absence of  any handicap.  S.























Number of  hours  student  spent  working,  first  week February  his
senior  year,  S.
MINORITY x  MALEHOME.
MINoRITY  x  MILE4YRU.
MINORITY  x  MILEJUCO.
MIN0RITY x  MILETECH.
MINoRITY x  HRSWoRK.
I{INORITY x  FINCOME.
Male  parent  or  guardian  1n household.  S.
Number of  niles  to  nearest  four  year  college  or  unlwersity.  A.
Nurnber  of  mlles  to  nearest  junior  college.  A.
Number of  niles  to  nearest  wocational/teehnical  school.  A.
Student  is  non-white.  HSB.
County  average  nanufaeturing  wage,  1980.  Occasionally,  the
average  manufacLuring  wage for  the  statistical  rnetropolitan  area
is  substituted.  HSB,
Duuny fot  teacher  representation  by  unions.  l-no  union  represents
teachers.  A.
Nunber of  roorns  in  student,s  place  of  residence.  S.
Number  of  student,s  siblings.  S.
Percent  of  (at  least  high  school  educated)  inmlgrant  population
that  ls  whire,  C.
P€rcent  of  (at  least  high  school  educated)  immigtant  population
that  ls  female C.
PRETEST:  Sura  of  the  munber of  correct  auswers  on the  mathematics,
vocabulary,  and  reading  HSB tests  adminlstered  to  the  younger
cohort  in  1980 (the  sophomore  year).  HSB.
RURAL:  High  school  is  rurally  located.  HSB.
S-EDFEMALE:  Average  education  (in  years)  of  fernale  parents  or  guard.ians
for  thls  school.  SC-
S-EDMALE: Average  education  (in  years)  of  mare paren.s  or  guardians  for  this
school.  SC.
S-I.IEMBERS:  12th  grade  student  nembership.  A.
S-NONENGL:  Fraction  of  student  body  for  whom  English  is  not  the
language  spoken  in  the  home.  A.
S-NUMROOMS:  Average  nurnber of  rooms in  the  students  r  hornes for
sc.
S-NUMSIBS:  Average  nurnber of  siblings  for  students  at  this  school.  SC.
S-WCUALE: Fraction  of  rnale parents  or  guardian  for  this  school  in  white
collar  occupations.  SC.
S-I'I0FEMALE:  Fraction  of  femare  parents  or  guardian  for  this  school  in  white
collar  occupations.  SC.
S-WHITE:  Fraction  of  studenr  body that  is  white.  A.
SAIARYOL: Salary  for  flrst  teacher,s  salary  step  _ BA degree.  A.
STBASE:  The estimated  stace  share  of  education  spending.  This  variable
vras constructed  by  multiplying  the  average  state  share  in  school
expenditures  for  each state  (1980) by  the  principal,s  report  of
per  pupil  high  school  expenditure.The  average level  of  state
educational  funding  by  state.
SUBURBAN:  High  school  ls  locared  in  a  suburb.  HSB.
TAx-Drsr:  Durnrny  for  whether  or  not  the  high  school  is  in  a  separate  schooL
taxation  district.  This  variable  takes  on che value  of  one when
first
thls  school.30
the  school  has  a  separate  taxatlon  district  and zero  othenrise-
WCMALE  :  Male  head of  household  has  lrhite  col-lar  occupation.  S.
WCFEI,IALE#:  Female head of  household  has  white  collar  occuDation.  S.
KEY:
A:  Data  for  this  wariable  come fron  the  school  administrator,s  survey.
C:  Data  for  this  wariable  corne fron  the  US Census Bureau.
S:  Data  for  this  variable  corne fron  the  studenc  surveys  administered  during
the  students'  senior  years.
SC:  Data  for  thls  variable,  intended  to  represent  a  connunity  characterlstic,
corne from  the  conbined  elder  and younger  st;dent  surveys.
HsB:  Data  for  this  varlable  r""  pro.rid"d  by  the  conpliers  of  High  School  and
Beyond.
':  At  the  individual  lawel  (used  when fltring  SPOSTIIAT)  this  is  a  dunmy
variable;  at  the  school  level  this  is  the  perlentage  of  the  schooL  sarnpie wich
this  trair.JI
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